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For two decades, the consensus explanation of the British Industrial Revolution has placed technological
change and the supply side at center stage, affording little or no role for demand or overseas trade.
Recently, alternative explanations have placed an emphasis on the importance of trade with New World
colonies, and the expanded supply of raw cotton it provided. We test both hypotheses using calibrated
general equilibrium models of the British economy and the rest of the world for 1760 and 1850. Neither
claim is supported. Trade was vital for the progress of the industrial revolution; but it was trade with
the rest of the world, not the American colonies, that allowed Britain to export its rapidly expanding
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The Industrial Revolution in Britain coincided with victory over the French in a struggle for 
world domination. After more than a century of struggle, in 1815 Britannia finally ruled the 
waves. The British used that mastery to gain access across the globe to raw materials and 
export markets. British trade with both the New World and the Old escalated.  
  Earlier histories of the Industrial Revolution linked military success, the expansion of 
trade, and the onset of modern growth (e.g., H. John Habakkuk and Phyllis Deane 1963). 
More recent accounts, however, starting with Joel Mokyr (1977), have emphasized in 
contrast its “home grown” nature. Technological advances in cotton textiles, iron and steel, 
and transport generated within Britain lie at its core (e.g., Nicholas F. R. Crafts, 1985, Mokyr, 
2005). The struggle for world domination, for colonies and markets, was of secondary 
importance. As Robert P. Thomas and Deirdre N. McCloskey (1981, p. 102) memorably 
noted, “Trade was the child of industry.” This consensus has been in turn challenged by 
Kenneth Pomeranz (2000). In his “coal and colonies” interpretation of the Industrial 
Revolution, Britain and not China had an Industrial Revolution in part because Britain had 
access to the raw materials of the New World, while China did not.  
  This paper sets out to test, with a formal CGE model, the role of trade with the New 
World, and trade itself, in explaining the growth of productivity and income in Industrial 
Revolution Britain. We find, to our surprise, that the New World mattered little, even by the 
1850s. Had the Americas not existed, the Industrial Revolution would still have looked much 
as it did in practice. There were ready substitutes for the cotton, sugar, corn and timber of the 
New World in Eastern Europe, the Near East and South Asia. 
However, had all trade barriers been substantial—if, say, a victorious France had cut off 
Britain’s access to overseas trade—then British history would have been very different. 
British incomes per person, instead of rising by 45% between the 1760s and 1850s, would 
have risen by a mere 5%. The TFP growth rate, already a modest 0.4% per year, would have   2 
fallen to 0.22% per year.  
The magnitude, scale and transforming power of the Industrial Revolution lay in its 
unification of technological advance with the military power that generated easy British 
access to the markets of Europe, the Americas, the Near East and the Far East. As Ronald 
Findlay and Kevin H. O’Rourke (2007) emphasize, trade in a mercantilist world was not just 
the product of comparative advantage, but of comparative advantage married to the musket 
and the cannon. Britain’s trading partners gained, however, along with Britain from the 
forced opening up of trade. A substantial share of the British TFP gain over these years was 
exported as cheaper manufactures to the rest of the world (Gregory Clark 2007a). 
I. The Model 
We ask what Industrial Revolution Britain would have looked like had trading opportunities 
with North America (and the Caribbean), or the rest of the world, been removed. We could 
use a simple Britain-only model and impose counterfactual trade levels, but as Nancy L. 
Stokey (2001) notes this approach is limited; absent detailed disaggregation it says nothing 
about cotton textiles and absent other regions and the terms-of-trade it says nothing about 
income and welfare. Our preferred tool is a three-region world economy model, for two 
benchmark periods, 1760–9 and 1850–9, the start and end of the Industrial Revolution. The 
model thus extends the two-region Industrial Revolution models developed by Crafts and 
Knick Harley (Harley and Crafts, 2000). 
  The computable general equilibrium model is fully described by two sets of information. 
The first is an accounting matrix for each region listing for each sector the value of goods 
produced, imported, and exported—and hence the domestic demand for those goods—and 
also the cost structure (inputs of primary factors and intermediate goods). The sectors are 
cotton textiles; other textiles; iron and steel; coal; agriculture; tropical raw materials; tropical 
food; and the rest of the economy. The factors are land, labor, and capital. All factors are   3 
region-specific but mobile across sectors (although land is used only in agriculture, tropical 
raw materials, and tropical food). The intermediate inputs accounted for by this model are: 
coal into iron and steel; agricultural products into other textiles and coal; and tropical raw 
materials into cotton textiles and other textiles (and, for the 1850s, into agriculture and the 
rest of the economy as well). 
The three regions are England (1760s) and later Britain (1850s); North America 
(including the Caribbean); and the Rest of the World (including Ireland). Trade is assumed 
costless. Goods produced in each region are assumed to be imperfect substitutes for each 
other, which allows two-way trade in the model. Imports and exports for each commodity are 
thus broken down by source and destination. Tropical raw materials and foods are produced 
in North America and the Rest of the World, but not in Britain. The regional production and 
trade matrices fully describe the static benchmark equilibrium, and are given in the appendix. 
   The second thing we need is a set of elasticities that describe the response of the 
economy to perturbations. Sectoral production is modelled as a Leontief combination of 
intermediate inputs and a value added aggregate. Value added is in turn a CES aggregate of 
the primary inputs. The elasticities of substitution in each sector are similar to those used by 
Harley and Crafts (2000): elasticities are 1 (Cobb-Douglas) in cotton textiles, other textiles, 
iron and steel, coal, and the rest of the economy; elasticities are 0.5 in agriculture, tropical 
raw materials, and tropical food. Consumption is modelled by assuming a representative 
agent in each region, endowed with all primary factors of production in that region, and 
spending all her income on a composite utility good (the production of which thus serves as a 
welfare indicator). The utility good is produced by a CES utility function, with all eight 
commodities as inputs, and an elasticity of substitution of 0.5. 
What consumers consume, and what sectors use as intermediate inputs, are actually 
aggregates of the different varieties of each commodity produced in each of the three regions.   4 
These 24 Armington aggregates, one for each sector and region, are again CES combinations 
of the three varieties of the relevant commodity. Values of the Armington elasticities of 
substitution used for each commodity are close to those used by Harley and Crafts: we used 
values of 5 for cotton textiles, iron and steel, and coal; 2 for ‘other textiles’ and the rest of the 
economy; and 100 for agriculture. The Armington elasticities for tropical raw materials and 
food are particularly important for the counterfactual experiments we conducted, and we 
consider these separately below. 
II. Calibration and Counterfactuals 
To  set  up  the  model  we  sourced  data  as  follows.  The  total  value  of  English/British 
expenditure  and  its  composition  across  different  goods  was  taken  from  Clark  (2007b). 
Imports and exports of each type of good were then taken from Ralph Davis (1962, 1979). 
Thus, the value of the production of each good could then be inferred. We imposed zero 
production of both tropical goods in Britain. Next, based on our rough estimates of factor 
shares and intermediate costs shares we were able to compute the input-output structure and 
the value of payments to factors in each sector, and thus in the aggregate. Via the circular 
flow, these factor payments equal total expenditure. For simplicity, we adjusted the rest of the 
economy sector’s output and exports to impose balanced trade, although our results do not 
depend on this assumption. 
  A different procedure was followed for the other two regions. For North America we 
assumed that final expenditure in each period on each good was a simple multiple of British 
expenditure, scaling by population relative to England/Britain, and thus assuming the same 
relative living standard (except that coal consumption was set equal to imports from Britain). 
For the Rest of the World we assumed that incomes per person relative to England were the 
same in the 1760s, and at 40% of the British level by the 1850s. In the rest of the world we 
imposed an assumed pattern of final consumption in each period, with the following weights   5 
for each sector: cotton textiles, 0.02, other textiles, 0.04, iron and steel, 0.01, coal, 0.001, 
temperate agriculture, 0.375, tropical agriculture, 0.375, rest of the economy, 0.18. Thomas 
Ellison’s discussion of cotton consumption per person in India in the 1850s suggests this is 
probably an underestimate of cotton and cotton goods production in the rest of the world, 
even though it implies that the cotton industry in the rest of the world was nearly 5 times as 
large as in England (Ellison, 1858, p. 73). Import and export data were then constructed using 
the  Davis  (1962,  1979)  data  for  trade  with  England/Britain  and  some  auxiliary  data  and 
assumptions.
1 Table 1 shows the resulting estimated trade patterns in the 1760s and 1850s. 
From the consumption and trade patterns we infer production patterns and, assuming that 
input cost shares in each sector were like those in Britain, we infer payments to intermediates 
and to all factors. Once again, factor incomes are equal to expenditure by construction, and 
trade was forced to be balanced by adjusting the rest of the economy sector in each case. 
With the model set up we impose various counterfactual shocks and see how the model 
world  economy  would  react.  Our  interest  is  in  evaluating the  hypothesis  that  the  British 
Industrial Revolution depended crucially on international trade—either with North America, 
the Rest of the World, or both. To that end, we impose three different counterfactual shocks 
on the model: 
a.  “No NA”: Reduce North American endowments by a factor of 20; 
b.  “No ROW”: Reduce Rest of the World endowments by a factor of 20; 
c.  “No NA/ROW”: Reduce both sets of endowments by a factor of 20; 
Note that we cannot entirely eliminate each region’s endowments since each region makes a 
differentiated product, whose price would be infinite were its supply to be reduced to zero, 
                                                             
1 In the 1760s case, we assume the Navigation Acts excluded direct trade between North America and the Rest 
of the World, and use Davis’s re-export data to estimate the bilateral trade pattern between North America and 
the Rest of the World. In the 1850s, the assumption is dropped, so we use Douglas Irwin’s North American 
trade data (Susan Carter et al. 2006) by good and by region, assuming that America’s import pattern from the 
Rest of the World was similar to Britain’s, and its export pattern to the Rest of the World was similar to its 
export pattern to Britain.   6 
but these endowment shocks provide a reasonable estimate of the gains from trade to the 
British economy that would have been sacrificed had trade been made almost impossibly 
costly. 
The purpose of the three experiments is to gauge how vital a contribution trade with each 
region, and trade as a whole, made to the structural transformation and growth of the British 
economy. For example, the “No NA” shock permits us to grapple with the thesis of Pomeranz 
(2000) and see how critical New World supplies of raw cotton were to the rise of Lancashire. 
The “No ROW” shock allows us to see the importance of other major export markets for 
Lancashire’s cotton products, as well as the role played by alternative suppliers of raw cotton 
like  Egypt  and  India.  In  the  remainder  of  the  paper  we  describe  the  results  of  these 
counterfactuals and how they pose a challenge to current interpretations of the Industrial 
Revolution. 
III. Results 
The results are given in Tables 2 and 3, but the intuition behind the results comes from the 
trade data in Table 1. The results depend largely on trade patterns in the 1760s and 1850s. 
Several differences between the two periods stand out. First, and most obviously, in the 
1760s England was still a large net importer of cotton textiles from the rest of the world, 
which also exported textiles to North America. By the 1850s, Britain was a large net exporter 
of cotton textiles to both the other regions, thanks to the new technologies of the Industrial 
Revolution. Second, in the 1760s England was paying for her imports of food and tropical 
products primarily with net exports of “other” goods, and of woollens and other textiles. By 
the 1850s, exports of non-cotton textiles had declined in relative importance: cotton textiles 
and exports of “other” goods were now relatively speaking far more dominant. A third point 
to note is that in the 1760s, imports of tropical raw materials came predominantly from the 
rest of the world, while imports of tropical food came predominantly from North America.   7 
By the 1850s, imports of tropical raw materials from North America had considerably grown 
in relative importance, thanks to the boom in raw cotton exports, while the rest of the world 
was now more important than North America as a source of tropical food imports. 
  Both “tropical raw materials” and “tropical food” cover a wide variety of goods from 
many regions of the world. From the British point of view, a crucial question, had trade with 
North America been impossible, is how easily could the raw cotton crucial for the growing 
cotton textile industry have been provided by the rest of the world. The experience of the 
early 1860s, when Brazil, Egypt and above all India sharply increased their exports to Britain 
in response to the “cotton famine,” suggests there would indeed have been a compensatory 
supply response from the rest of the world, although not a perfectly elastic one, since British 
industry did suffer during the cotton famine.  
In our model, the issue boils down to the size of the Armington elasticity of substitution 
between the tropical raw materials Britain was importing from North America and the rest of 
the world. We experimented with several values for this elasticity, as well as with the 
corresponding elasticity for tropical food. While the elasticity of substitution between New 
World sugar and Asian pepper, say, might not have mattered for the fortunes of British 
industry, it should have had an impact on British consumer welfare, in a counterfactual world 
in which Britain was prevented from trading with either of the two regions. In our benchmark 
specification, these elasticities are both set to 5, since these are the ‘upper end’ Armington 
elasticities used by Harley and Crafts, but we also tried lowering the elasticities to 2, and 
increasing them to 100 (equivalent to making the different varieties of these goods almost 
perfect substitutes). 
  Table 2 gives the results of isolating England from its trading partners in the 1760s. For 
each of our three counterfactual scenarios, the model generated outputs in each sector; prices 
in each sector; nominal factor prices; the price of the utility good, which is equivalent to a   8 
consumer price index; nominal household income; real factor prices and household income; 
and utility (i.e. the output of the utility good). The most important point is that preventing 
trade between England and North America would have had barely any effect on England. In 
the benchmark case, utility declines by less than 2%, with a modest real wage decline of 
4.3%, a decline in real profits of 5.7%, and a rise in real land rents of 9.4%. Cotton textiles 
output would have gone down only barely: by just 1.1%, as compared with a decline in the 
output of other textiles of almost a tenth, the latter due to the disappearance of North 
American markets. 
  Removing the rest of the world would have had a bigger effect, since it was a much 
bigger region. Strikingly, eliminating trade between England and the rest of the world in the 
1760s would have increased English cotton textile output by a third, since England was still a 
net importer of Indian cotton textiles. Similarly, English agricultural output would have 
expanded (by 8.8%) to replace food imported from the rest of Europe. As a result all other 
sectors would have contracted, as resources were sucked away from them. Utility would have 
declined less than previously (1.7%), but with greater distributional shifts, since in the 1760s 
English imports of temperate climate agricultural products still came predominantly from 
Europe rather than from North America (or other continents). Thus English landlords would 
have seen real incomes rise by over a quarter, while workers and capitalists would have seen 
real incomes declines of 7.9% and 10.6% respectively. 
  Not surprisingly, ‘eliminating’ both North America and the rest of the world has an even 
bigger impact on the traditional textile sector, cutting it by over a quarter. Cotton textiles 
production would have increased by a quarter, and agriculture by 14.5%. Real rents increase 
by 44.9%, at the expense of real wages (down 13.9%) and real profits (down a fifth), but the 
aggregate utility effect would still have been surprisingly small (a decline of less than 4%). 
Finally, note that varying the Armington elasticities for tropical food and tropical raw   9 
materials would have barely changed the results. 
  Table 3 shows that the results are very different for the 1850s. Cutting off trade with 
North America in the benchmark case would have lowered cotton textiles output by 8%, and 
other textiles output by a tenth. Cotton textiles output would have declined both because of 
the disruption to raw cotton supplies, and because of the loss of markets. On balance, the 
former effect seems to be more important, since the real price of British cotton textiles 
increases in this simulation. Furthermore, when the elasticity of substitution between tropical 
raw materials from North America and the rest of the world is lowered to from its benchmark 
value of 5 to 2, implying that the rest of the world was less able to substitute for lost 
American raw cotton supplies, British cotton textiles output contracts by more (15%-18%). 
On the other hand, if that elasticity is raised to 100, then the output only falls by 2%. Utility 
falls by between 1.6% and 3.6%, depending on the sizes of Armington elasticities chosen, 
with larger elasticities corresponding to lower welfare losses. While these are larger welfare 
effects than those calculated for the 1760s, they are still modest. The rest of the world could 
have filled in for a missing North America, providing markets, raw materials and tropical 
food products, and so minimising the overall loss to the British economy. Once again, 
landlords would have gained by roughly 10%, at the expense of workers and capitalists. 
  On the other hand, the welfare loss is much greater—over 10%—when trade with the rest 
of the world, rather than North America, is eliminated. Cotton textiles output contracts by 
over a third, as the foreign markets upon which Lancashire was increasingly dependent 
vanish. (Note the difference with the results for the 1760s: by the 1850s Britain was a net 
exporter of cotton textiles to India and the rest of the world, rather than a net importer.) Since 
the rest of the world mattered for the British cotton textiles industry more by providing 
markets than by providing raw cotton, it is not surprising that the two Armington elasticities 
highlighted earlier turned out to be essentially irrelevant for this counterfactual experiment.   10 
Consistent with Stokey (2001), the distributional effects of this shock are enormous, with real 
rents more than doubling, and real wages and profits declining by over a fifth. In terms of 
TFP performance, a decline of a third in the cotton textile sector would have lowered the 
economy-wide TFP growth rate by .06% per annum, or by 6% over the entire 1760s-1850s 
period (assuming unchanged sector-specific TFP growth rates). 
  Finally, “eliminating” all of Britain’s trading partners would have had an even bigger 
effect on the economy, with utility falling by over 27% in the benchmark case (again, this 
result was invariant to changes in the two afore-mentioned Armington elasticities). This is an 
enormous effect in the context of a model with no increasing returns or other non-concavities, 
and is much larger than previous estimates in the literature (for example, according to Harley 
(2004, p. 194), “Self-sufficiency in 1860...would have cost Britain only...about 6 per cent of 
national income”). Cotton textiles output would have declined by almost three-fifths, 
implying a reduction in the economy-wide TFP growth rate of 0.11%, more than a quarter of 
the Industrial Revolution productivity growth rate, while real wages and profits would have 
declined by over a third. If we had been able to go further, and completely eliminate Britain’s 
trading partners, the effects on economy-wide welfare and textiles output would obviously 
have been even greater (and the crucial cotton textiles sector would of course have vanished 
altogether). And ours may yet be a conservative estimate of hypothetical TFP losses, for if 
the dynamic cotton textiles sector had grown more slowly, then the incentives to innovate (or 
even passive “learning by doing” opportunities) might have been scaled down too. 
IV. Conclusion 
While colonies were not required for an Industrial Revolution, supply-side TFP growth was 
not alone sufficient. In Smithian terms, in the 19th-century global “division of labor” it was 
the “power of exchanging” that “gave occasion” to the Industrial Revolution. The highly 
specialized British economy was extremely dependent on foreign trade by the 1850s.   11 
  It is worth emphasising why the 1850s results are so different from the 1760s. This has 
nothing to do with model specification. The model is identical in both cases, as are all the 
embedded elasticities. The different results arise from the data fed into the model, which in 
turn reflect the profound shifts in the structure of the British economy during the Industrial 
Revolution. First, unbalanced productivity growth meant that British autarkic relative prices 
diverged from those in the rest of the world, implying much larger gains from trade. The 
cotton textiles sector became dependent on foreign markets for about 60% of its total sales. 
Second, British population growth meant that the island depended on foreign agriculture for 
both food and raw materials, implying that it needed to export a growing amount of 
manufactures to pay for these imports (Harley and Crafts 2000; Clark 2007a). 
As a famous Welsh economic historian put it, “How could this unprecedented 
swarming of people on a small, offshore island be made consistent with a rising standard of 
living? It was impossible on the fixed area of English cultivable land, whatever miracles 
English technological progress in agriculture might accomplish. The way out was for 
England (through a transportation revolution and international trade) to endow itself with the 
equivalent of a vast extension of its own land base” (Brinley Thomas 1985, p. 731). In that 
context, by the mid 19
th century, the maintenance of an open international trading system was 
of vital strategic importance to Britain.   12 
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Table 1. Trade flows, 1760s and 1850s (£ millions) 
1760 Cotton Other  Iron & Coal Agricul- Rest of Tropical Tropical
textiles textiles Steel ture Economy raw mat. food
ROW to GB 0.697 1.766 0.471 0.000 2.729 0.117 1.139 1.047
GB to ROW 0.045 3.053 0.826 0.321 0.422 3.892 0.000 0.000
NAM to GB 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.602 0.001 0.255 3.901
GB to NAM 0.176 1.962 0.372 0.012 0.150 1.504 0.000 0.000
ROW to NAM 0.085 0.495 0.000 0.000 0.210 0.016 0.001 0.165
NAM to ROW 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.020 0.310
1850s Cotton Other  Iron & Coal Agricul- Rest of Tropical Tropical
textiles textiles Steel ture Economy raw mat. food
ROW to GB 0.000 8.695 0.000 0.000 67.268 16.677 25.120 15.297
GB to ROW 33.889 11.471 14.710 5.534 0.000 82.677 0.000 0.000
NAM to GB 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 13.014 2.705 19.845 8.659
GB to NAM 5.691 6.829 4.866 0.291 0.000 11.330 0.000 0.000
ROW to NAM 0.000 1.441 0.000 0.000 15.140 28.782 8.998 6.899
NAM to ROW 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 13.545 2.815 20.655 9.012  
 
Source: See text.   15 
 
Table 2. Counterfactual results, 1760s 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Elasticities:
BM No NAM No ROW Neither No NAM No ROW Neither No NAM No ROW Neither No NAM No ROW Neither No NAM No ROW Neither
Outputs
Cotton textiles 100 98.9 133.4 125.6 98.6 133.3 125.4 101.6 133.3 128 100.7 133.3 127.6 98.7 134.2 124.5
Other textiles 100 90.7 86.8 73.9 90.7 86.8 73.9 90.9 86.8 74.1 90.8 86.8 74 90.9 87.2 73.9
Iron and steel 100 107.4 83.5 65.3 107.6 83.5 65.4 108.9 83.5 66.1 109.4 83.5 66.3 106.2 83.9 64.4
Coal 100 100.7 92.3 92.7 100.7 92.3 92.7 100.1 92.3 92.2 100.1 92.3 92.2 101 92.3 93
Agriculture  100 103.7 108.8 114.5 103.7 108.8 114.5 103.8 108.8 114.5 103.8 108.8 114.5 103.5 108.6 114.4
Other  100 98.3 93.8 90.9 98.3 93.8 90.9 98.1 93.8 90.8 98.1 93.8 90.8 98.5 93.9 91
Prices
Cotton textiles 100 94.3 82.6 75.2 94.5 82.6 75.4 94.5 82.6 75.4 95 82.6 75.8 93.9 83.1 74.8
Other textiles 100 94.9 84.1 77.6 94.9 84.1 77.6 94.9 84.1 77.7 95.1 84.1 77.8 94.6 84.7 77.4
Iron and steel 100 92.8 79.8 70.4 92.7 79.8 70.4 92.8 79.8 70.5 92.7 79.8 70.5 92.7 80.5 70.4
Coal 100 93.5 81.3 72.8 93.5 81.3 72.8 93.5 81.3 72.9 93.4 81.2 72.8 93.4 82 72.8
Agriculture  100 99.7 94.7 94.7 99.7 94.7 94.7 99.7 94.7 94.7 99.7 94.7 94.7 99.3 95.2 94.5
Other  100 93.2 80.5 71.9 93.1 80.5 71.8 93.1 80.5 71.9 93 80.5 71.9 93.1 81.2 71.8
Wages 100 93.6 81.3 73.3 93.5 81.3 73.3 93.5 81.3 73.3 93.4 81.2 73.3 93.5 81.9 73.3
Profits 100 92.2 78.9 68.6 92.2 78.8 68.6 92.3 78.8 68.7 92.2 78.8 68.7 92.2 79.6 68.6
Rents 100 107 111.6 123.3 107.1 111.6 123.3 107.1 111.5 123.4 107.2 111.5 123.4 106.3 111.8 123
Price of utility 100 97.8 88.3 85.1 97.8 88.3 85.1 99.3 88.3 86.1 99.5 88.3 86.3 96.6 89 84.2
Nominal income 100 96.0 86.8 82.3 95.9 86.8 82.2 95.9 86.8 82.3 95.9 86.8 82.3 95.8 87.4 82.2
Real wage 100 95.7 92.1 86.1 95.6 92.1 86.1 94.2 92.1 85.1 93.9 92.0 84.9 96.8 92.0 87.1
Real profits 100 94.3 89.4 80.6 94.3 89.2 80.6 93.0 89.2 79.8 92.7 89.2 79.6 95.4 89.4 81.5
Real rents 100 109.4 126.4 144.9 109.5 126.4 144.9 107.9 126.3 143.3 107.7 126.3 143.0 110.0 125.6 146.1
Real income 100 98.1 98.3 96.7 98.1 98.3 96.6 96.6 98.3 95.6 96.4 98.3 95.4 99.2 98.2 97.6
Utility 100 98.1 98.3 96.7 98.1 98.3 96.6 96.6 98.3 95.6 96.4 98.3 95.4 99.1 98.3 97.6
TRM=100; TFOOD=100 TRM=5; TFOOD=5 TRM=2; TFOOD=5 TRM=5; TFOOD=2 TRM=2; TFOOD=2
 
 
Notes: BM = Benchmark. No NAM = North American endowments set to 5% of actual. No ROW = rest of 
world endowments set to 5% of actual. Neither = North American and rest of world endowments set to 5% of 
actual. TRM = Armington elasticity of substitution between North American and rest of world tropical raw 
materials. TFOOD = Armington elasticity of substitution between North American and rest of world tropical 
food.   16 
 
 
Table 3. Counterfactual results, 1850s 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Elasticities:
BM No NAM No ROW Neither No NAM No ROW Neither No NAM No ROW Neither No NAM No ROW Neither No NAM No ROW Neither
Outputs
Cotton textiles 100 92 65.8 41.3 85.4 65.7 41.3 90.9 65.8 41.3 82.2 65.7 41.2 98 66.4 41.6
Other textiles 100 90.1 90 74.2 89.5 90 74.2 90 90 74.2 89.2 90 74.2 90.5 90.1 74.3
Iron and steel 100 99.8 115.4 112.8 101.5 115.4 112.9 100.2 115.4 112.8 103 115.4 112.9 98.5 115.4 112.6
Coal 100 101.4 88.1 79.3 101.5 88.1 79.3 101.4 88.1 79.3 101.4 88 79.3 101.4 88.1 79.4
Agriculture  100 104.2 130.7 123.3 104.4 130.7 123.3 104.3 130.7 123.3 104.6 130.7 123.3 103.9 130.7 123.4
Other  100 100.4 87.3 99.1 100.8 87.3 99.1 100.4 87.3 99.1 100.9 87.3 99.1 100 87.3 99
Prices
Cotton textiles 100 100.4 81.4 61.9 104.4 81.5 62 101 81.4 62 106.7 81.5 62 97.2 80.5 60.5
Other textiles 100 96.8 76.1 31.5 97.4 76.2 31.5 96.9 76.1 31.5 97.8 76.2 31.5 96.5 75.9 30.9
Iron and steel 100 94.5 67.2 20.7 93.9 67.2 20.7 94.4 67.2 20.7 93.7 67.2 20.7 95.1 67.2 20.4
Coal 100 94.2 63 19.8 93.6 63 19.8 94.1 63 19.8 93.3 63 19.8 94.8 63 19.5
Agriculture  100 100.1 101.2 29.6 100 101.2 29.7 100.1 101.2 29.6 100 101.2 29.7 100.1 101.1 29.2
Other  100 94.1 61.7 20.8 93.5 61.7 20.8 94 61.7 20.8 93.4 61.7 20.8 94.6 61.6 20.4
Wages 100 94.3 61.3 19.6 93.7 61.3 19.6 94.1 61.3 19.6 93.4 61.3 19.6 94.8 61.2 19.3
Profits 100 93 60.5 18.7 92.3 60.5 18.7 92.9 60.5 18.7 92.1 60.5 18.7 93.7 60.5 18.4
Rents 100 107.9 167.8 41.3 108.1 167.8 41.3 108 167.8 41.3 108.3 167.8 41.3 107.4 167.6 40.8
Price of utility 100 97.4 79 29.5 97.5 79 29.5 97.5 79 29.5 97.9 79 29.5 97.1 78.8 29
Nominal income 100 95.1 71.0 21.3 94.6 71.0 21.3 95.0 71.0 21.3 94.3 71.0 21.3 95.6 70.9 21.0
Real wage 100 96.8 77.6 66.4 96.1 77.6 66.4 96.5 77.6 66.4 95.4 77.6 66.4 97.6 77.7 66.6
Real profits 100 95.5 76.6 63.4 94.7 76.6 63.4 95.3 76.6 63.4 94.1 76.6 63.4 96.5 76.8 63.4
Real rents 100 110.8 212.4 140.0 110.9 212.4 140.0 110.8 212.4 140.0 110.6 212.4 140.0 110.6 212.7 140.7
Real income 100 97.6 89.9 72.3 97.0 89.9 72.3 97.4 89.9 72.3 96.4 89.9 72.4 98.5 90.0 72.5
Utility 100 97.7 89.8 72.4 97 89.8 72.4 97.4 89.8 72.4 96.4 89.8 72.4 98.4 90 72.6
TRM=100; TFOOD=100 TRM=5; TFOOD=5 TRM=2; TFOOD=5 TRM=5; TFOOD=2 TRM=2; TFOOD=2
 
 
Notes: BM = Benchmark. No NAM = North American endowments set to 5% of actual. No ROW = rest of 
world endowments set to 5% of actual. Neither = North American and rest of world endowments set to 5% of 
actual. TRM = Armington elasticity of substitution between North American and rest of world tropical raw 
materials. TFOOD = Armington elasticity of substitution between North American and rest of world tropical 
food. 
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Data Appendix 
The social accounting matrices for the three regions at the two benchmark dates are shown at 
the end of this appendix, and they were constructed as follows. 
Great Britain, 1850s 
Cotton textiles: Cotton here includes cotton and linen and jute. The value of output is taken as 
£67.8 m. based on value of imports of cotton, flax, indigo and other dyestuffs of £31.6 m. 
(Davis 1979, 109, 124–5) and a markup estimate (Harley 1998, table 5, 64). Labor and capital 
shares in value added are assumed 50:50 based on Harley (1998), and Harley and Crafts 
(2000), but modifying for the absence in our model of the non-traded sector. The implied 
value added in “cottons” is 6.3% of total value added. The employment share of this sector in 
England and Wales in 1851 was 5.9%, so this figure seems reasonable (Parliamentary Papers, 
1852–3). 
Other textiles: These are the wool and silk industries. The value of outputs of £60.4 m. and 
intermediate  inputs  (£15.8  for  wool  and  £6.3  for  silk)  are  from  Deane  and  Cole  (1967, 
196–210) and Davis (1979). Labor and capital shares are again taken as 50:50. The implied 
value added here is 6.6%. That makes the combined value added in all the textile industries 
12.9%. The employment share of all textiles in 1851 in England and Wales was 11%, but this 
is assumed a more capital intensive sector than on average. 
Iron and steel: This is here taken to include other metals and metal manufactures such as tin, 
copper, lead and zinc. Employment in these sectors was 5.5% of all employment in England 
and Wales in 1851. To account for these other metal sectors output was taken as £69.4, 1.5 
times the output for iron alone given by Deane and Cole (1967, 225) figure for iron alone. 
Coal inputs of £11 m. calculated from coal required per ton given in Hyde (1977, 142, 153). 
Labor and capital shares are 67:33 based on Harley and Crafts (2000). This implies a value 
added share of 10.1%. The employment share of the metal industries in England and Wales 
was just 5.5%, but given the high assumed capital/labor ratio this is reasonable. 
Coal: A physical net output of 65 m tons for Great Britain was estimated from Church (1986, 
3, 19). This corresponded to a value of £37.1 based on an average price at final consumption 
of £0.57. There was a domestic farm input of horses, oats, timber, etc., of £0.8 from Church 
(1986, 502, 521–2). Labor, capital, and land shares of 0.61, 0.27, and 0.12 are based on Clark 
and Jacks (2007, table 6, 55).  
Agriculture: British output of £123.8 estimated by scaling up the estimated English output of 
£96.2 given in Clark (2002, table 2) by the relative farm areas of Britain and England (1.26:1) 
in 1866. Inputs of guano, etc. from UK imports given by Davis (1979) assuming all of this 
went to British agriculture . Labor, capital, and land shares of 0.41, 0.15, and 0.44 are based 
on Clark (2002), table 2. These outputs are again scaled up to Britain by multiplying by the 
relative farm areas of Britain and England in 1866. 
Rest of the economy: Total nominal GDP for Britain of £576.6 was calculated by scaling up 
figure of £503.8 for England and Wales from Clark (2001), table 3, by the ratio of British to 
English and Welsh populations (21.81:18.83). Value added in the rest of the economy is 
calculated as a residual between this scaled up figure and the sums of output for the above 
industries. All tropical raw materials not used as inports in other sectors are assumed to be 
inputs here. In this sector, which includes large amounts of services, the inputs were assumed 
to be 70% labor and 30% capital. 
Imports: Imports are partitioned into those from North America and the Caribbean, and those 
from the rest of World (including Ireland). For North America and the Caribbean, and the rest   18 
of World, the data are from Davis (1979), pp. 109, 124–5 on imports minus re-exports into 
the UK, and are the average of the years 1854–6. 
The Davis figures include Ireland. We thus need to allocate these imports between Britain 
and Ireland. Ireland’s population was 21.6% of UK population, but since we assume Irish 
income per person was only 0.6 of that in the UK (comparing wages as in Clark (2005), and 
Geary and Stark (2004)), Irish income was only 14.2% of UK income. We assume the only 
imports to the UK going to Ireland were tropical foods (tea, coffee, sugar etc.), and allocate 
these proportionally to income. This gives Ireland £3.2 m. of such imports, compared to 
British consumption of £19.0 m. 
Ireland is assumed to export just linen textiles and food to England. We assume linen imports 
to  Britain  from  Ireland  equal  British  cotton  textiles  exports  from  Britain  to  Ireland.  We 
assume consumption of each good in Ireland is 16.55% of British consumption based on the 
estimated relative incomes above (and implicitly assuming that preferences are identical and 
homothetic in Ireland and Britain). That makes Irish cotton textile consumption £4.7 m., and 
hence linen exports £4.7 m. also. 
Agricultural output in Ireland is assumed to be the same per acre as in Britain. Based on 1866 
acreages this makes it £56.0, compared to £123.8 in Britain. Since final UK consumption is 
£218.5 this makes Irish agricultural exports to Britain £25 m. 
Total final use: Sum of all the above. (Final use here means total supply to the market net of 
intermediate use.) 
Exports: Exports to Ireland, North America and the Caribbean, and the rest of World are 
calculated separately. For North America and the Caribbean, and the rest of World the data is 
from Davis (1979), p. 101, and is the average of 1854–6.  
Exports of cotton, iron and steel and coal to Ireland are based on the assumption that Britain 
produces the entire UK output, and Irish consumption is 0.142 of the UK total. To balance 
trade  between  Britain  and  Ireland  we  assume  Britain  exports  £10.25  m.  of  “rest  of  the 
economy goods to Ireland.” This makes total British exports to Ireland £29.7 m. 
A balancing factor of £38.2 is added to rest of the economy exports to the rest of the world to 
assure overall trade balance in the UK as well as in Britain. 
 
Rest of the World, 1850s 
Production: In each sector, output is total final use minus imports plus intermediate uses. All 
intermediate input shares are as in Britain, except coal is replaced by wood produced in the 
agricultural sector. Labor and capital shares are assumed at 70:30 for cotton textiles, other 
textiles, iron and steel, coal and the rest of the economy, reflecting less mechanization (lower 
capital shares) than in Britain. The labor, capital and rent shares in agriculture, tropical raw 
materials and tropical food are set at 40%, 20%, and 40% as in British agriculture. 
Production plus net imports is set to final consumption. 
Imports: Imports from the UK are based on Davis’s export data for the UK to the rest of the 
world for 1854–6, adding in British exports to Ireland. Exports from North America and the 
Caribbean to the rest of the world are assumed to have same composition as UK imports from 
this region. The level of exports from US to the rest of the world is estimated from Doug 
Irwin’s U.S. Historical Statistics exports estimate of $144 million total exports from the US 
compared to $71 million going to the UK in 1850 (Irwin, 2006a).   19 
Exports: Exports to the UK are based on Davis’s import data for the UK from the rest of the 
world. Exports from the rest of the world to North America and the Caribbean are assumed to 
have same composition. The level of exports from the rest of the world to North America and 
the Caribbean is computed from Irwin’s U.S. Historical Statistics total US imports estimate 
of $174 million, with $75 million coming from the UK, in 1850 (Irwin, 2006b). A balancing 
factor of £22.8 m. is added to rest of the economy exports from the rest of the world to North 
America to assure overall trade balance in both the rest of the world and North America and 
the Caribbean. 
Consumption: We assume the rest of the world total consumption expenditure is £13,118.4 
m., given by British consumption times 22.75. This ratio is based on an assumed rest of 
world:British population ratio of 1,240:21.8 and a consumption per person ratio of 40%. This 
assumes a total world population of 1,300 in the 1850s based on the estimates of Durand 
(1977), Haub (1995) and McElready and Jones (1978). We assume consumption weights in 
the rest of the world are: cotton textiles 2%, other textiles 4%, iron and steel 1%, coal 0.1 %, 
temperate agriculture 37.5%, tropical raw materials 0%, tropical food 37.5%, and the balance 
for rest of the economy. These shares are adjusted from those of Britain to reflect lower 
incomes and higher textile prices, based in part on Clark (2007), 40–70. Thus in Britain 
cotton textiles were 4.9% and other textiles 8.8%. 
Total final use: For each sector this is consumption plus exports minus imports. 
 
North America and Caribbean, 1850 
Production: In each sector, output is total final use minus imports plus intermediate uses. 
Coal  output  and  input  use  is  set  to  zero  (forcing  imports  to  go  to  consumption).  All 
intermediate input shares are as in Britain, except coal is replaced by wood from agriculture. 
Labor and capital shares are assumed at 50:50 for cotton textiles, and other textiles; at 33:67 
for  iron  and  steel,  and  70:30  for  the  rest  of  the  economy,  reflecting  assumed  similar 
mechanization levels to Britain. Labor, capital and rent shares in agriculture, tropical raw 
materials and tropical food are set at 40%, 20% and 40% as in British agriculture. 
Imports: Imports from the UK are based on Davis’s export data for Britain to North America 
and the Caribbean. Imports from the rest of the world to this region are assumed to equal 
exports by the rest of the world to North America. 
Exports: Exports to the UK are based on Davis import data for Britain from the rest of the 
world. Exports to the rest of the world are assumed to equal imports by the rest of the world 
from North America. 
Consumption:  We  assume  total  consumption  expenditure  in  North  America  and  the 
Caribbean was £1101.6, given by British consumption times 1.91. This ratio is based on an 
assumed North America and the Caribbean: British population ratio of 41.7:21.8 (Mitchell, 
2003), and a North American and Caribbean consumption per person equal to that of Britain 
per person. We assume homothetic identical preferences in Britain and North America and 
the Caribbean. 
Total final use: For each sector, consumption plus exports minus imports. 
 
England, 1760. 
Cotton textiles: Cotton again includes cotton and linen and jute. The value of output is taken 
as £1.4 m. based on value of imports of cotton, flax, indigo and other dyestuffs of £0.19 m.   20 
(Davis, 1962, 300) and markup estimate (Harley, 1998, table 5, p. 64). Labor and capital 
shares are assumed 50:50 as in the 1850s. 
Other textiles: Represents wool and silk. The value of outputs £14.88 and intermediate inputs 
of wool and flax (£3.15) are from Deane and Cole, 1967, 196, 210. Raw and thrown silk 
inputs (£0.75) are from Davis (1962), 300. Labor and capital shares are assumed 50:50 based 
on the 1850s shares. 
Iron and steel: The output of £1.57 m. is from Deane and Cole (1967, 221). The coal input of 
£0.19 m. is calculated from the input:output ratios given in Hyde and coal prices calculated 
from Clark and Jacks (2007, 67). Labor and capital shares are 67:33 based on Harley and 
Crafts (2000). 
Coal:  Output  of  £3.41  m.  from  Flinn  (1984)  estimate  of  output  of  6  m.  tons  and  final 
consumption price of £0.57. Agricultural input of horses, oats, timber, etc., of £0.04 m. from 
Church (1986, 502, 521–2). Labor, capital, and land shares of 0.61, 0.27, and 0.12 are based 
on Clark and Jacks (2007, table 6, 55) as in 1850. 
Agriculture: Output of £38.9 m. and labor, capital, and land shares of 0.38, 0.14 and 0.48 
from Clark (2002, table 2). 
Rest of the economy: Nominal GDP of £95.3 m. from Clark (2001), table 3. Value added 
based on residual GDP not accounted for by other sectors. Labor and capital shares are 70:30 
as in 1850. 
Imports: Imports from North America and the Caribbean, and the rest of world are from 
Davis (1962), pp. 300–1. Since Davis only gives data for 1752–4 and 1772–4, the figures for 
1772–4 were used.  
Total final use: This is the sum of production and imports minus intermediate uses for each 
sector. Final use here means total supply to the market net of intermediate use. 
Exports: Exports to North America and the Caribbean, and to the rest of world are from 
Davis (1962), pp. 302–3. Since Davis only gives data for 1752–4 and 1772–4, the figures for 
1772–4 were used. A balancing factor of £2.88 is added to rest of the economy exports to the 
rest of the world to assure overall trade balance for England. 
 
Rest of the World, 1760 
Production: In each sector, output is total final use minus imports plus intermediate use. All 
intermediate input shares are as in England, except coal is replaced by lumber (agriculture). 
Labor and capital shares are assumed at 70:30 for cotton textiles, other textiles, iron and steel, 
coal  and  rest  of  the  economy,  reflecting  less  mechanization  (lower  capital  shares)  than 
England. Labor, capital and rent shares in agriculture, tropical raw materials and tropical food 
are set at 40:20:40 as in England agriculture. 
Imports: Imports from England are based on Davis export data for England to the rest of the 
world. Imports from North America are assumed to be England’s reexports to rest of the 
world. 
Exports: Exports to England are based on Davis import data for England from the rest of the 
world. Exports to North America are assumed to be England’s reexports to North America. 
Consumption: We assume the Rest of the World total consumption expenditure is £13,118, 
given by England’s consumption times 50, minus North America’s consumption. This ratio is 
based on a world population of 770 million versus England and Wales 7 million and Scotland   21 
1.26 m (Clark, 2007, 139, Mitchell and Deane, 1971, 5). We assume the Rest of the World 
living standards were approximately 50% of England levels based on Clark 2007, 40–70. 
We assume consumption weights in the rest of the world are different as follows: cotton 
textiles 3%, other textiles 3%, iron and steel as England, coal as needed to absorb imports, 
agriculture 37.5%, tropical raw materials 0%, tropical food 37.5%, and the balance for rest of 
the economy. This is to reflect the Engel curves which show foodstuffs at higher levels of 
consumption when incomes are lower. 
Total final use: For each sector, consumption plus exports minus imports. 
 
North America and Caribbean, 1760 
Production: In each sector, output is total final use minus imports plus intermediate use. Coal 
output and input use is set to zero (forcing imports to go to consumption). All intermediate 
input shares are as in England, except coal is replaced by lumber (agriculture). Labor and 
capital shares are assumed at 70:30 for cotton textiles, other textiles, iron and steel, and for 
the rest of the economy, reflecting lower mechanization levels than England. Labor, capital 
and rent shares in agriculture, tropical raw materials and tropical food are set at 40:20:40 as 
in English agriculture. 
Imports: Imports from England are based on Davis export data for England to North America. 
Imports from the rest of the world are assumed to equal England reexports to North America. 
Exports: Exports to England are based on Davis import data for England from North America. 
Exports to the rest of the world are assumed to equal England re-exports to the rest of the 
world. 
Consumption:  Assume  North  America  total  consumption  expenditure  is  assumed  as  £91, 
given  by  England  consumption  times  1.  This  ratio  is  based  on  an  assumed  North 
America:England population ratio of 1 based on the various population estimates for the 
Americas in Mitchell 2003. We assume homothetic identical preferences in England and 
North America. 
Total final use: For each sector, consumption plus exports minus imports. 
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Data Appendix: The Social Accounting Matrices 
 
A. For the 1760s 
 
ENGLAND Cotton Other  Iron & Coal Agricul- Rest of Tropical Tropical Labour Capital  Rent
textiles textiles Steel ture Economy raw mat. food L K R
Cotton tex 1.4 -0.19 -0.605 -0.605 0
Other tex 14.88 -3.15 -0.751 -5.4895 -5.4895 0
Iron + Steel 1.57 -0.19 -0.4554 -0.9246 0
Coal 3.41 -0.04 -1.78 -1.47 -0.12
Agriculture 38.9 -14.7 -5.7 -18.5
Rest of economy 35.101 -24.571 -10.53 0
Import 0.697 1.766 0.481 0 3.331 0.118 1.394 4.948
Total final 2.097 16.646 2.051 3.22 39.041 35.219 0.453 4.948
Cons 1.876 11.631 0.853 2.887 38.469 29.823 0.453 4.948
Exports 0.221 5.015 1.198 0.333 0.572 5.396 0 0  
 
REST OF  Cotton Other  Iron & Coal Agricul- Rest of Tropical Tropical Labour Capital  Rent
WORLD textiles textiles Steel ture Economy raw mat. food L K R
Cotton tex 134.4 -18.2426 -81.323 -34.853 0
Other tex 132.89 -28.132 -6.70701 -68.636 -29.415 0
Iron + Steel 41.44 -5.0152 -25.498 -10.928 0
Coal 0 0 0 0
Agriculture 1706.64 -682.66 -341.33 -683
Rest of economy 800.7743 -560.54 -240.23 0
Trop raw material 26.06929 -10.428 -5.2139 -10.4
Trop food 1671.92 -668.77 -334.38 -669
Import 0.045 3.053 0.827 0.321 0.46984 3.892079 0.020265 0.31002
Total final 134.5 135.94 42.27 0.321 1673.96 804.6664 1.14 1672.23
Cons 133.7 133.68 41.8 0.321 1671.02 804.5334 0 1671.02
Exports 0.782 2.261 0.471 0 2.939 0.133 1.14 1.212  
NORTH Cotton Other  Iron & Coal Agricul- Rest of Tropical Tropical Labour Capital  Rent
AMERICA textiles textiles Steel ture Economy raw mat. food L K R
Cotton tex 1.615 -0.21918 -0.9771 -0.4187 0
Other tex 9.174 -1.9421 -0.46302 -4.7382 -2.0307 0
Iron + Steel 0.492 -0.3443 -0.1475 0
Coal 0 0 0 0
Agriculture 43.5759 -17.43 -8.7152 -17.4
Rest of economy 28.30408 -19.813 -8.4912 0
Trop raw material 1.40946 -0.5638 -0.2819 -0.56
Trop food 8.99402 -3.5976 -1.7988 -3.6
Import 0.261 2.457 0.372 0.012 0.36 1.52 0.001 0.165
Total final 1.876 11.631 0.864 0.012 41.9938 29.82408 0.728265 9.15902
Cons 1.876 11.631 0.853 0.012 41.344 29.823 0.453 4.948
Exports 0 0 0.011 0 0.64984 0.001079 0.275265 4.21102  
Note: Negative entries denote inputs. 
Source: See text.     24 
 
 
B. For the 1850s 
 
BRITAIN Cotton Other  Iron & Coal Agricul- Rest of Tropical Tropical Labour Capital  Rent
textiles textiles Steel ture Economy raw mat. food
Cotton tex 67.81 -31.6 -18.105 -18.105 0
Other tex 60.413 -15.822 -6.261 -19.165 -19.165 0
Iron + Steel 69.38 -11 -19.265 -39.114 0
Coal 37.13 -0.7798 -21.054 -14.11 -1.19
Agriculture 123.792 -2.58 -49.392 -18.9 -52.9
Rest of economy 290.673 -4.524 -200.3 -85.845 0
Imports 0 8.7031 0 0 80.282 19.382 44.965 23.9562
Total final 67.81 69.116 69.38 26.13 187.472 310.055 0 23.9562
Cons 28.23 50.816 49.8 20.31 187.472 216.0481 0 23.9562
Exports 39.58 18.3 19.58 5.825 0 94.00694 0 0  
 
REST OF Cotton Other  Iron & Coal Agricul- Rest of Tropical Tropical Labour Capital  Rent
WORLD textiles textiles Steel ture Economy raw mat. food
Cotton tex 228.5 -106.473 -85.404 -36.602 0
Other tex 523.39 -137.08 -54.2427 -232.45 -99.621 0
Iron + Steel 116.5 -18.467 -68.605 -29.402 0
Coal 7.585 -5.3092 -2.2754 0
Agriculture 5143.8 -2057.5 -1028.8 -2058
Rest of economy 2308.156 -1615.7 -692.45 0
Trop raw material 174.1781 -69.671 -34.836 -69.7
Trop food 4932.57 -1973 -986.51 -1973
Imports 33.89 11.479 14.71 5.534 13.5452 85.49235 20.655 9.01243
Total final 262.4 534.87 131.2 13.12 5001.8 2393.648 34.1176 4941.59
Cons 262.4 524.73 131.2 13.12 4919.39 2348.189 0 4919.39
Exports 0 10.136 0 0 82.4078 45.45945 34.1176 22.1966  
NORTH Cotton Other  Iron & Coal Agricul- Rest of Tropical Tropical Labour Capital  Rent
AMERICA textiles textiles Steel ture Economy raw mat. food
Cotton tex 48.24 -22.4799 -12.88 -12.88 0
Other tex 88.825 -23.264 -9.20553 -28.178 -28.178 0
Iron + Steel 90.28 -14.313 -25.068 -50.896 0
Coal 0 0 0 0
Agriculture 407.142 -162.86 -81.428 -163
Rest of economy 378.1452 -264.7 -113.44 0
Trop raw material 63.18783 -25.275 -12.638 -25.3
Trop food 56.5379 -22.615 -11.308 -22.6
Imports 5.691 8.27 4.866 0.291 15.1398 40.11245 8.997602 6.89936
Total final 53.93 97.095 95.14 0.291 384.705 418.2577 40.5 63.4373
Cons 53.93 97.078 95.14 38.79 358.145 412.7373 0 45.7659
Export 0 0.0163 0 0 26.5592 5.520408 40.5 17.6714  
Note: Negative entries denote inputs. 
Source: See text and Clark, O’Rourke, and Taylor (2008).  
 
 